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this explanation as race-neutral, the court explained, would be
"to accept no reason at all."' 906 Therefore, the court held that the
prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge was racially
907
motivated and thus ordered a new trial.
Both the New York state courts and the federal courts interpret
their respective Equal Protection Clauses as prohibiting the use of

peremptory challenges in racially discriminatory manners. 908
Therefore, in Peart, the defendants' equal protection rights
pursuant to both constitutions had been violated.
909
People v. Rodney
(decided April 12, 1993)

The defendant, a black man convicted of possession and sale of
a controlled substance, claimed that the State of New York
violated the Equal Protection Clause of both the State 91o and

Federal 9 11 Constitutions, by employing its peremptory challenges
188, (2d Dep't 1991) (finding that the prosecution's use of its peremptory
challenge was racially discriminatory where the explanation for the exclusion
was that a black crime victim did not see her perpetrator punished and that her
own experience could hinder her from finding that an identification could be
made).
906. Peart, 197 A.D.2d at 600, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
907.. Id.
908. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (stating that purposeful
racial discrimination in picking a jury violated a defendants right to equal
protection that a "trial by jury is intended to secure"); People v. Bolling, 79
N.Y.2d 317, 320, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1139, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (1992)
(stating that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a discriminatory
manner violates the Equal Protection Clause not only because it violates the
defendant's rights but it also harms the excluded jurors, and the public at
large).
909. 192 A.D.2d 626, 596 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1993).
910. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.").
911. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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during voir dire in a racially-discriminatory manner. 9 12 The
Appellate Division, Second Department held that the defendant's
constitutional rights were violated. 9 13 The defendant was able to
establish a prima facie case demonstrating that the state had
exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially-discriminatory
manner, and that the state failed to come forward with a race9 14
neutral reason for striking so many "black venirepersons."
The defendant was arrested in a "buy-and-bust" operation after
assisting in the sale of crack cocaine to an undercover police
officer. 9 15 After a jury trial in the Supreme Court, Queens
County, the defendant was convicted "of criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession
of a controlled substance in the seventh degree ... "916
However, it was shown that during the selection of the jury, the
prosecutor used a "disproportionately high number of peremptory
"....
917 When questioned
strikes against black venirepersons

about the reasons for striking this group of people, the prosecutor
stated that she did not want them on the jury "because they did

Id.
912. Rodney, 192 A.D.2d at 626, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
913. Id.
914. Id. at 672, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 171 (adopting the three-pronged test set
forth by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97
(1986)). Inorder for the defendant to establish proof of discriminatory use of
the peremptory challenge by the state, "the defendant first must show that he is
a member of a cognizable racial group" and that the prosecutor has challenged
venire persons that are from the same group. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Second,
the defendant can rely on the fact that peremptory challenges created a jury
selection practice that allows "'those to discriminate who are of the mind to
discriminate.'" Id. (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
Finally, the defendant must be able to prove that "these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor" excluded certain
people from the jury based on their race. Id. "Once the defendant makes a
prima facie showing, the burden shifts," and the state must give a race-neutral
reason for excluding such jurors. Id. at 97.
915. Rodney, 192 A.D.2d at 626, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
916. Id.
917. Id.
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not have children." 9 18 It was then established that some of the
white people approved by the prosecutor to sit on the jury also
did not have children. 9 19 To this, the prosecutor "asserted that
the challenged black venirepersons did not fit her 'prototype' of
920
the juror she was seeking."
In reaching its decisions on defendant's equal protection claim,
the court determined that although a "race-neutral reason [for a
peremptory challenge] need not rise to the level required for
cause," it is not sufficient for the prosecutor to merely assert
good faith and deny discriminatory intent. 92 1 In support of this

contention, the court cited People v. Boiling,922 which
recognized that the discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge
violates the equal protection clause of the State Constitution. 92 3

Bolling further recognized that "a prosecutor's discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges violates [the constitution] not only
because it violates the defendant's rights but also because it
harms excluded jurors and the community-at-large. "924
918. Id.
919. Id. at 626 , 596 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71.
920. Id. at 626-27, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 171.

921. Id.; see also People v. Dove, 172 A.D.2d 768, 569 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2d
Dep't 1991). Prosecutor was not able to recall his "reasons for challenging
four black prospective jurors" and merely stated his "general practice" in
selecting juries. Id. at 769, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 148. The Dove court held that
"[this] testimony 'amounted to little more than a denial of discriminatory
purpose and a general assertion of good faith,' and [therefore] failed to satisfy
the People's burden of overcoming the presumption of discrimination found by
this court." Id. (citation omitted).
922. 79 N.Y.2d 317, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1992).
923. Id. at 320, 591 N.E.2d at 1139, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 953; see People v.
Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 643, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1236, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648
(1990). The Kern court held that exclusion of "persons of a particular race
from service on a criminal jury" through the use of peremptory challenges
amounts to racial discrimination which "has no place in our courtrooms,
and... is prohibited by both the Civil Rights Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of our State Constitution." Id.
924. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 321, 591 N.E.2d at 1139, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 953;
See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). Racial discrimination in
using peremptory challenges to strike black venire persons "denies [the
defendant] the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." Id. The
whole point of a jury is that the defendant be tried by his equals, his peers, the
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Furthermore, in People v. Lavon,9 2 5 the court held that "'[flor
purposes of equal protection, the constitutional violation of the
equal protection clause is the exclusion of any blacks [from a
jury] solely because of their race.'" 9 2 6 In the case at bar, it was

irrelevant that the prosecutor allowed some black jurors to
remain on the panel, because even one racially motivated

peremptory challenge is enough to constitute a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights. 92 7
The state law appears to comport with the federal law on this
issue. In Batson v. Kentucky, 9 2 8 the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment "guarantees the defendant
that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury

venire on account of race,.., or on the false assumption that
members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as
jurors." 92 9 Therefore, the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions prohibit the use of raciallydiscriminatory peremptory challenges by the prosecution in
selecting a jury panel.

"persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds." Id.;
People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 557, 554 N.E.2d 47, 51, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10,
14 (1990). The court held that "Oj]ury duty is an important privilege and
obligation of citizenship that should not be denied to some citizens simply
because of their race." Id. at 557-58, 554 N.E.2d at 51, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
Furthermore, the court found that "[t]his type of discrimination undermines
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Id. at 558, 554
N.E.2d at 51, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
925. 166 A.D.2d 670, 561 N.Y.S.2d 258 (2d Dep't 1990), appeal denied,
80 N.Y.2d 834, 600 N.E.2d 645, 587 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1992).
926. Id. at 670, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (quoting Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d at 559,
554 N.E.2d at 51, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14).
927. Rodney, 192 A.D.2d at 627, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
928. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
929. Id. at 86; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991) (applying the Batson approach in civil cases).
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